Eminent Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) literature concentrates on critical success factors for implementation. More recently, published work relates to ERP maintenance and upgrade practices. In papers concerning all phases of the ERP lifecycle, researchers commonly gather material via case studies of organizations comparatively new to ERP implementation, maintenance, or upgrade projects. This paper uses a literature review detailing critical success factors and best practices during all phases of the ERP lifecycle to frame a case study on a large company with a decade of experience in supporting an ERP system through implementation, two major upgrades, one major domestic business merger, and two international business acquisitions. This paper catalogs the company's departures and concurrences with the published best practices and success factors over time, as well as the positive and negative consequences of its decisions. The company's experience shows that straying from generally accepted best practices can lead to a successful outcome, and that portraying some success factors too well can exacerbate problems in other areas.
Introduction
Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems are commercial software packages that embody and integrate any number of business processes involved in the operation of an organization including but not limited to manufacturing, supply chain, sales, financial, human resources, budgeting, and customer service activity. Academic research on ERP frequently involves finding critical success factors for implementing, maintaining, and upgrading these complex information systems [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] [16] [17] . Many of these papers use case studies to gather research. Often, researchers choose case study organizations that are relatively new to the ERP implementation, maintenance, or upgrade process, or they choose to highlight only one phase of the ERP lifecycle during their research [1, 3-6, 8-10, 12, 13, 15-17] . It is important, while ERP installations in organizations age and evolve, that authors investigate companies with experience in all phases of the ERP lifecycle to gather and refine the commonly acknowledged success factors.
The goal of this study is to examine a company with years of practice and considerable understanding of all phases of the ERP lifecycle in order to illustrate the good and bad consequences of drifting from recognized best practices.
In addition, the study shows how decisions, behaviors, and practices established during the initial implementation phase compound over a ten-year period to amplify areas of success and failure. Finally, the case study shows that exemplifying some critical success factors can lead to or propagate continued failure in other areas. A review of ERP literature regarding behaviors and practices that aid in ensuring success in all phases of the ERP lifecycle provides a construct against which to compare the activities of the case study organization.
2
Review of the Literature ERP literature uses the terms success and failure to describe the outcome of many ERP related activities. Measuring the results of any project is a subjective exercise that depends on the point of view of a project participant. ERP projects require the participation of functional and technical experts from every level of an organization. Each member of the team is likely to rate the effects of a project on aspects related to his or her role. For example, an executive may measure success based on return on investment while a database administrator may rate success on database architecture and performance. A manager may determine that a project is successful if it completes on time and within budget. An end user may consider the ERP endeavor successful if it improves job performance or convenience. The literature review continues the use of the terms success and failure with the same intent. Individuals rate the outcome of an ERP project based on their perspectives [17] .
During the ERP system lifecycle, implementers must overcome common obstacles on the way to successfully completing both small and large ERP related endeavors. The review examines common deterrents, as well as conventions to encourage and dissuade over the project's entire duration. After the overarching critical success factors, the literature review highlights phase specific best practices from initial ERP system implementation through upgrade.
Throughout the ERP Lifecycle
There are practices to encourage and discourage throughout the ERP lifecycle. ERP teams should be vigilant to avoid and overcome common impediments to success that may occur at any time during implementation, maintenance, or upgrade.
Behaviors to Encourage
Organizational change management is imperative throughout the ERP lifecycle. Change management includes user training on functional and system processes as well as commitment from executives to communicate project scope and goals to the affected employees in the organization [3, 9, 10, 16, 17] . Communication and extensive training initiatives are critical to combat inevitable resistance to change. Communication and training activities fall under the umbrella of successful business process management [3, 10] . Do not underestimate the amount of training end users require. ERP systems have steep learning curves; heavy users need more training than light or occasional users [3, 9] . Users will require training in new business processes as well as the technical use of the ERP system. Provide special attention to recovering from incorrect data entry during training. Because ERP packages are integrated environments, the impact of incorrect data can be profound and can affect multiple areas of system functionality [17] .
Top management commitment is not only critical to controlling organizational change. Dedication from the executive level is significant during all activities associated with ERP implementation and upgrade [3, 9, 10, 12, [14] [15] [16] . Adopting an ERP system is a costly venture that requires commitment and prioritization from key decision makers. An ERP package may cost as much as acquiring new facilities or buying another business. ERP initiatives deserve the same supervision as any other capital investment [9] . The involvement of a respected and admired manager in business process re-engineering activities motivates employees and mediates disagreements [3, 10] . Arbitration by executive management is vital when lower levels of management disagree on priorities. Inconsistent decision-making can lead to contradictory communication of goals, requirements, or plans [3, 15] . The highest level of management controls the allocation of resources important to successful ERP implementations and upgrades: the best people, adequate time, and sufficient budget [12] .
Allocate sufficient resources for the ERP system support team responsible for implementation, maintenance, and upgrade. The support team includes personnel with experience in IT infrastructure, database administrators, ERP developers, and functional experts [3, 5, 8-10, 12, 16] . In some cases, when an organization cannot provide this expertise in-house, it can outsource some or all of the responsibility to a consulting firm or ERP vendor [5] . Knowledge acquisition requirements for ERP systems are steep. New project members will require significant time to familiarize themselves with ERP concepts and technology. When possible, leverage key players from ERP implementation initiatives for ERP maintenance and upgrade endeavors [8] . Members of the project teams should be dedicated full time to the effort, empowered to make decisions, and chosen for their skills and flexibility [9, 10, 12] . If consultants are used to aid in the implementation or upgrade, develop a concrete plan for the consultant team to relay vital information before the contract ends [9] . ERP systems require extensive hardware, database, and networking infrastructure and the experts required to maintain its configuration. Do not discount the support of dedicated database and system administrators [3, 12] .
Behaviors to Avoid
Avoid assigning responsibility for ERP systems to the IT department. Ardent participation and guidance from the business is imperative. Managing the technology rather than the business process is a poor decision [3, 10, 15, 17] . ERP systems are not IT exercises. They are organizational development tasks that fundamentally change the way that enterprises operate and conduct business. IT departments are not equipped to manage these endeavors alone [3] . The primary objective of an ERP implementation or upgrade project should be organizational enhancement, not implementing software. Executives often make the mistake of framing ERP activities as technical in nature rather than operational [10] . Management of an ERP project by the IT department, with little or no support from the organizational leadership, is one cause of failure in an unsuccessful upgrade [15] . Finally, viewing ERP systems as only a technology device leads to unidentified business related results because a business case was never prepared against which to measure performance. Unknown benefits from ERP implementations discourage management participation or support in ERP maintenance or upgrade; they see no operational incentive, and therefore do not care to invest time or resources in future endeavors [17] .
Although research suggests [3, 10, 15, 17] that IT departments should avoid responsibility for ERP management, the most emphatically denounced practice is revising ERP source code. Modification to the ERP system source code should be avoided at all costs [1-4, 8, 9, 12, 17] . In general, the expense, profit, and risks associated with ERP projects directly relate to the extent of ERP source code modifications [4, 12] . Extreme derivations from the generic offerings of ERP vendors increase the risk of failure [1, 4, 12] . Re-structuring the ERP software to fit business practices decreases the likelihood of realizing operational benefits [2, 4, 12] . Significant source code revisions often cause projects to exceed their budget and schedule [9] . Furthermore, customizing ERP software in place of organizational change is a frequent factor in disappointment with the overall system [3] . Making ERP software modifications to alleviate resistance to business process alteration in the end-user community is costly. Moreover, the practice of carrying on these modifications through maintenance and upgrade phases compounds the price tag significantly over time [8] . Adopters of a new ERP system are often not familiar enough with the software to determine if revisions to the software are required. After failing to implement modifications successfully, they discover delivered functionality to satisfy the requirement. Software modifications delivered by consultants are often not well tested and need significant re-work before production integration. Unfortunately, some businesses report that some modification is necessary to avoid the negative consequences of doing without the functionality [17] . Write a detailed and intensive business case to justify and quantify the cost of customizations in terms of the impact of the functionality to organizational operations before revising the ERP system logic [12] .
Impediments to Success
There are several obstacles that ERP system implementers should overcome and correct quickly should they encounter them. These common complications often contribute to failure [13, 17] . Changing, inconsistent, or a lack of requirements from the business at any phase of the ERP lifecycle is problematic. It wastes money, time, and causes unnecessary frustration to people playing many roles on an implementation or maintenance team. Understaffing project teams is a grave mistake. Consider and accept the cost of adequate resource planning as a necessity for implementation success before the task begins. Support from the business from the executive level, through management, to the end-users is vital. Participation in process mapping, requirements gathering, testing, and training will be required at all levels throughout the entire duration that the ERP package is in production [13] . Businesses must be willing to change or re-engineer business processes to some degree when choosing to implement an ERP package. Expecting to proceed in an identical manner after implementation is foolish. If those expectations go unchanged, the likelihood of ERP failure increases. Interfacing ERP systems to existing legacy systems is an area that case studies cite as problematic. One reason for interfacing problems is inadequate testing. ERP system teams should be careful to test all threads of execution thoroughly before migration to production. Finally, many ERP adopters list insufficient reporting capabilities as a problem. Research suggests that difficult reporting needs are better satisfied outside of the ERP system [17] .
Implementation
Common ERP implementation best practices and critical success factors include defining goals and strategic planning, selecting the appropriate ERP package, and business process re-engineering [1-4, 8-10, 12, 17] . One way in which the success of an ERP implementation is measured is by how well the system meets an organization's clearly defined goals and target return on investment [2, 10] . Diligent research in choosing the ERP package that aligns best with the current modes of operation can eliminate some stressful changes [1] [2] [3] 10] . The business practices embodied by ERP packages are usually very flexible; organizations can customize them during installation. Adapting enterprise processes to match the ERP system wherever possible is a frequent and resounding recommendation [1-4, 8-10, 12, 17 ].
An organization's leaders must define clearly the objectives for an ERP implementation before any other activity begins. As part of this exercise, the stakeholders document their need for the system and which of their business processes the ERP package will embody. Management should establish their expectation for deliverables from the system. Additionally, the leadership should ascertain the strategic benefit of using ERP software [10] . Organizations choose to employ ERP systems for many reasons that include the desire to replace several legacy systems, systems integration, and decreasing operating expense [2] . Regardless of the basis for exploring ERP solutions, stakeholders must first develop their goals precisely and elaborate on the manner that an ERP system should deliver for the business processes involved. A documented set of objectives and desired deliverables on which to analyze an ERP system's performance is a good way to judge its success beyond the usual parameters of schedule and budget expectation [2, 10] . As part of the strategic plan, the key personnel must prepare to lead, facilitate, and champion extensive change in the business processes identified for ERP implementation once they choose the correct product [1] [2] [3] 10] .
It is crucial that organizations take the utmost care when selecting an ERP package. ERP systems that cooperate poorly with the operations of an enterprise are likely to cause failure [1] [2] [3] 10] . ERP systems govern an enterprise's everyday function. Consequently, employing the use of an ERP system in an organization implicitly charters the ERP manufacturer's concepts regarding the management of the enterprise [10] . Although ERP systems come with many configuration options, it is impossible to tailor every aspect of the system during installation. The likelihood of finding an ERP system that operates in the exact framework of an organization's existing business process is painfully slim [1, 2] .
Because finding an ERP system that aligns exactly to an organization's mode of operation is unlikely, the planning phase of an ERP implementation almost certainly requires mapping current business processes to coincide with the selected software package. Organizational change is difficult; employees at all levels are likely to resist or resent even small modifications to their daily routines. Onerous or not, business process re-engineering is critical to the success of ERP implementation [1-4, 10, 12] . Modifications beyond the configuration of the system during installation are emphatically discouraged for multitudinous reasons by academic literature, case studies, consultants, and ERP vendors [1-4, 8-10, 12, 17] . Conscientious selection of installation options based on the requirements laid out by the organization in the planning phase ensures the use of the system's most advantageous configuration [1] . Process mapping exercises instigated by an ERP implementation are an opportunity to re-examine and streamline long-standing behaviors. Furthermore, ERP systems often represent widespread industrial best practices [3] .
Maintenance
The ERP maintenance period begins after implementation ends and continues until the organization removes the system from production. Best practices in the realm of ERP maintenance remain largely unexplored in academic literature. The existing work agrees that popular software maintenance models are not entirely applicable to ERP packages. Furthermore, a larger percentage of ERP maintenance activity centers from user support and investigation requests than other types of software [5, 6] . Although the maintenance phase includes system upgrades, this review examines them separately. Upgrade efforts expend greater resources and require different processes than everyday maintenance activities, and therefore deserve independent consideration [5] [6] [7] [8] .
Respected standards and best practices for software system maintenance published by the IEEE (Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers) and SEI (Software Engineering Institute) do not wholly satisfy the unique circumstances of organizations sustaining ERP implementations. An ERP implementation support team must constantly keep in mind the interplay of vendor-instigated change with user requests for change or enhancement. Popular software maintenance models do not consider this interaction. They do not include steps for seeking out vendor-supplied solutions or for weighing immediate implementation through customization versus waiting for the next upgrade. Moreover, an ERP support team faces decisions on whether to re-apply previous user initiated enhancement customizations after the installation of vendor provided patches that overlay modifications or to continue with the delivered functionality. The driving factor behind each decision should be the cost of each modification versus the benefit it brings to the business. Evaluate the decision in conjunction with every change request. The users, support team, and leadership initiate ERP maintenance activities from inside the enterprise. ERP vendors create work from outside the organization in the guise of bug fixes and patches. A successful ERP maintenance framework must consider how the service requests originating from inside and outside the organization relate to each other [5] [6] [7] .
Organizations sustaining ERP implementations can expect a larger part of their maintenance work from user support and investigation requests than a team supporting an in-house developed software package. Some support teams can alleviate these types of requests through intensive and repeated system training. ERP maintenance requires a specialized support staff with knowledge of both the functional and technical aspects of the system in order to handle user support and investigation requests. Many organizations choose to outsource the maintenance of their systems rather than attempt to acquire this expertise within the enterprise. Commonly, ERP adopters fail to consider the cost of maintaining even simple modifications over the ERP lifecycle. On average, the cost of sustaining ERP software is 25% of the original implementation price every year [5, 6] .
Upgrade
Historically, literature on ERP system upgrade best practices has been hard to come by. Newer research asserts that best practices for ERP implementation and ERP upgrade are almost identical [8, 12, 15] . ERP upgrade projects are massive undertakings that require adequate budgeting of human, capital, and time resources to succeed [11, 14, 17] . Businesses see more return on their upgrade investment when they drive the project to fulfill specific organizational requirements [6, 8] . The success of upgrades often depends on several human factors, including leadership support, the composition of the upgrade team, and the organizations investment in training [8, 12] .
Framing ERP upgrade projects in the same light as ERP implementations is critical to their success. Case studies and reflective experience studies recommend the same practices for implementation and upgrade, but admit they might have varying degrees of importance. The same papers warn that even organizations whose ERP implementations were triumphant often find themselves facing problems during upgrade because they did not follow the same careful process [8, 12, 15] . Many organizations discount the complexity of the ERP upgrade process; they view it like a general maintenance activity. ERP maintenance and upgrade activities share similarities. As mentioned in previous sections, ERP systems require a specialized support team and ERP related decision making beyond the scope of software developed in house [6, 8] . One study cites the implementation and support team as the most important critical success factor between both the implementation and upgrade stages [12] . Another study asserts that enterprises should keep winning implementation teams together for upgrades [8] . Despite some similarity to maintenance, ERP upgrades also call for some efforts that take place during system implementation like developing a business case for an upgrade, adjusting business processes to new and changed functionality, and extensive training. Technical analysis of the IT infrastructure's ability to house the upgrade system must also occur. Business cases, business process re-engineering, extensive training, and infrastructure overhaul do not normally account for day-to-day maintenance activity [6, 8] . Organizations that do not seriously consider the intricacy of an ERP upgrade and plan as vigilantly as they did for implementation may be unsuccessful. One documented case relates several reasons that the first ERP upgrade after a great implementation at one organization failed. The IT department managed and made decisions without input from top business management. The enterprise did not keep a commitment to freeze changes and enhancements to the current ERP environment. Finally, the expectations of the executive leadership at the enterprise were for an uncomplicated, inexpensive endeavor and managed the upgrade according to those expectations [15] .
ERP upgrades are expensive and somewhat venturesome; ERP systems, after all, do preside over vital business processes, which could be a risk if the upgrade goes poorly [11] . When facing a tight budget, organizations attempt to eliminate or diminish the importance of vital activities such as testing and training [8, 11, 14, 17] . Organizations should expect to spend 25% of the project schedule on testing [11] . Testing should be performed with each process the ERP system embodies in mind. Perform system training from the perspective of gaining maximum return on investment. Strategic goals for upgrade will go unrealized if the users are not able to use the system correctly. During an upgrade, it is important to evaluate any modifications made to ERP source code. Analyze the upgrade system's increased functionality. Determine if new, delivered capabilities can replace all or some custom ERP source code modifications. Sustaining customized ERP source code from one release to the next is error prone, increases upgrade and maintenance costs and diminishes overall return on investment [8] . Eliminating the overall scope of the upgrade is an option to try to rescue the budget; keep in mind that the scope of an upgrade directly relates to the business case for the upgrade. Reducing the scale of the upgrade may lower general return on upgrade investment for the organization if desired functionality is not implemented [17] .
In order to avoid low return on upgrade investment, upgrades should coincide with business need or business expansion. Conducting an ERP upgrade for increased productivity, some new required functionality, or to help implement a change in business strategy is ideal because much of the business case and process re-engineering activities required for an upgrade will already be taking place. Like in an implementation, it is difficult to measure the return on investment of an ERP upgrade performed solely for technical reasons. Because of the expense, many enterprises wait until they face the decision to upgrade or lose vender support while running a very old release of the system. It may be difficult to obtain top management support for an upgrade with no business case and no strategic goal [8, 11, 14, 17] .
Case Study
The subject organization for this case study is a large company, called LC for anonymity. LC is part of a superior, umbrella corporation. The primary business of LC is systems integration and software development. Information was gathered over several interviews in person and by telephone. All of the interviewees for this case study are members of the organization's financial ERP support team. Three of the participants have been on the ERP support team since the project's inception in 1997. The three long-term members of the team that provided information for this case study currently hold the positions of program manager, chief architect, and staff ERP business analyst. Over the past ten years, they have held various positions on the support team. A team member with two years experience on the team was also interviewed in person. The newer team member is a software developer on the support team.
LC's ERP Background

Implementation
In 1997, LC made a purely technical decision to adopt an ERP system to replace the company's legacy financial system. The legacy system was not Y2K compliant. The threat of system failure in the year 2000 was the only driver for ERP implementation. The legacy system was comprised of several modified off the shelf mainframe systems integrated through in-house developed interfaces. This legacy system was in production at LC for twelve years. LC set a target production date of March 1999 for the new financial system.
After considering several systems including JD Edwards, CMS, and SAP, LC selected PeopleSoft version 7 for its ERP financial system. LC selected PeopleSoft because it used client server architecture, and LC considered it extremely customizable. LC did not plan to conduct extensive business process re-engineering during its ERP implementation; therefore, a customizable system was very attractive. LC was pushed to revisit their business processes in order to minimize the need for software modifications. LC created a task force to investigate the possibility of business process re-engineering. The task force determined that it was better to stand by the business process and modify the new system in every manner to embody the existing mode of operation. Participants in the case study felt the task force exerted only perfunctory efforts before arriving at its decision. Because the business did not permit process modification, a significant amount of PeopleSoft source code required customization during its implementation.
The implementation team was comprised of twenty-five people, including consultants, functional representatives from the businesses, and the IT staff hired for the project. LC sent their IT staff for extensive PeopleSoft technology training. Most of the functional staff was only partly dedicated to the implementation effort. Two of the functional team members, all of the consultants, and all of the IT staff spent all of their time on the ERP implementation. The project completed on time and for the allotted ten million dollar budget. The IT staff had some significant hurdles to overcome during the implementation. Although the business was adamant about not changing their existing business processes, the processes were undocumented. Developers had to read the COBOL source code of the legacy system in order to ascertain the logic they had to transfer to the new system. Users accustomed to receiving stacks of paper reports delivered to their desks were not keen on the idea of using an IT system to run reports on demand. A consulting group created user manuals and trained the end users. The users received one week of technical training on the new system. LC did not conduct training on the business process because it did not change.
In general, LC considered the ERP implementation a success. Users were able to function on the PeopleSoft system immediately. They did not have any Y2K related problems. LC was happy that they were able to implement without changing their daily operations. Moreover, the PeopleSoft system allowed LC to process their data weekly, rather than monthly, which improved cash flow significantly. The IT team was proud of the accomplishment; they completed the job on schedule and within budget. The implementation team received bonuses and there was a party to mark their success. There were no problems with the many in-house developed interfaces from the ERP system to other systems in the company.
First Upgrade
In April of 2002, LC implemented a purely technical upgrade to PeopleSoft version 8.1 to maintain vendor support. Once again, there was no business process re-engineering. The business was satisfied with the existing system, and therefore not supportive of the upgrade project. The upgrade team was much smaller than the initial implementation team. There were five full time developers on the IT staff; all of them had been on the team since the initial implementation. There were also four outside consultants, DBA and infrastructure support, and three business representatives dedicating a small part of their time to the upgrade effort.
The new version of PeopleSoft was entirely web-based; the infrastructure team was elated because they did not have to maintain installations of a client on end-user PCs. PeopleSoft delivered a contracts module in version 8.1; there was significant customization required to change the vendor software to meet the needs of LC. Additional delivered enhancements included workflow capability and e-mail notification. A third party system enhanced reporting capability by providing access to PeopleSoft data. Although the third party system was an improvement, users resisted the change. Previously, users struggled with the interface provided by PeopleSoft to create reports. Furthermore, users were not creating reports properly; Cartesian joins on financial transaction tables regularly caused database performance problems. Consultants implemented the third party reporting tool. The developers still consider the reporting tool a problem five years later because knowledge did not transfer from the consultants properly before the consulting contract ended.
The upgrade schedule was extremely tight. The schedule allotted for only nine months. The implementation date exceeded the schedule by one month. Because the infrastructure was new, it took a long time to establish a reliable development environment for the technical team. Overall, the IT staff thought the project was successful because of the technical improvements offered by a web-based infrastructure and a reporting tool that satisfied the business need for ad-hoc reporting while eliminating the possibility of performance issues caused by Cartesian joins. The upgrade team received no bonuses for this project. The business was not very pleased or supportive of the upgrade. They did not see any benefit to the upgrade, only unwelcome changes in their reporting tools and user interface. Developers gained the added responsibility of conducting user training and creating user manuals. Before production integration, users conducted an official acceptance test.
Business Merger
In June of 2004, LC and another company in the umbrella corporation merged into one company. The ERP support team transitioned the other company to LC's financial system because the technology was newer and more flexible than the other company's mainframe system. Extensive changes were required to the PeopleSoft system in order to support the operational requirements of the other company. Surprisingly, this business merger instigated extensive business process re-engineering. The top financial executives for the new organization originated from the other company. Case study participants credit that fact as the reason for such extensive operational change. Each requirement required heavy negotiation; each business was reluctant to change their process.
The merger team was composed of the five full time developers on the IT staff, two database administrators, and one systems administrator. There was no consultant help. The business was heavily involved in the upgrade due to the extensive business process re-engineering required. The developers were responsible for all user training and user manual changes. The developers also conducted training on the business process because of the modifications made during the merger. The transition completed on time. Because of their heavy involvement, both the business and the technical members of the team felt a great sense of accomplishment when the project completed successfully.
International Acquisition One
In July of 2006, the ERP support team transitioned an international business unit to the system. A business consultant with years of experience in international accounting educated the team on differing statutory requirements, Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP), currency conversion, revaluation, and Value Added Tax (VAT). The consultant was very valuable, and successfully transitioned his knowledge to the team before his contract ended. There were five full time developers on the team, two database administrators, and two systems administrators. Before development started on the international accounting project, two technical consultants assisted with programming work associated with existing customer service requests for maintenance and enhancements. The technical team felt that the business would be more supportive of the international initiative of they were not waiting on maintenance deliverables. It was difficult to illicit requirements from business representatives for this project because the international business base was very small. Business representatives did not consider the project a high priority and were reluctant to donate much of their time to related work. There was no support from the executive level down to explain the initiative or communicate what changes would occur domestically and why they were required or important to the business. Executives outlined the priority and importance of the project with the IT team and expected them to drive the project.
New interfaces were essential to feed data from irreplaceable international legacy systems to the LC ERP system. Extensive changes in the system's many ERP source code bolt-on modules and integrated customizations allowed for international capability. The development team conducted training for the international users via teleconference on the business process and the technology. An extensive user acceptance test preceded production integration, but business participation in testing and training was reluctant. In order to support a European business, interface processing moved from Monday morning to Sunday morning. The move has caused stress in the work life balance of many members of the technical ERP support staff. The business gained hours of productivity on Monday mornings domestically, and the ability to increase the business base internationally.
Current Initiatives
LC's ERP support team is currently supporting two business critical projects. The first project is the second major upgrade for LC since its ERP implementation. The other project is the second international acquisition. The composition of the ERP support team has recently undergone significant change. Two of the developers on the team since the implementation now occupy leadership roles. One is program manager; the second is chief architect. A business user has transitioned full time to a role on the ERP support team as a liaison between the technical and business organizations. Shortly after the major domestic business merger, a third key developer on the team became a staff ERP analyst whose expertise is valued by the financial ERP support team and other organizations in the business. There are now six full time developers on the team in support roles with a development lead and a test lead. Two of the developers, in addition to the program manager, chief architect, and staff ERP business analyst have been on the team since the implementation. The development team is under pressure to support production, critical maintenance, upgrade, and international acquisition activities. The infrastructure team, consisting of two database administrators and two system administrators are haggard from supporting the same; all of these endeavors force a constant infrastructure shuffle to scavenge sufficient hardware resources for the project.
Second Upgrade
Since 2005, the ERP support team has been urging the business to fund an upgrade to a new version of PeopleSoft. The current version is near the end of its duration of vendor support. Furthermore, the target version of PeopleSoft, version 8.9, puts LC on the upgrade path suggested by Oracle to their financials customers. Like the previous upgrade, the current upgrade is purely technical in nature. The business is not supportive. The extraordinarily tight schedule and budget are prohibitive. LC is happy with the current system and has nothing to gain in business benefit. Because of the unyielding schedule allotted by the business, Sarbanes-Oxley regulations regarding fourth quarter changes to financial software, and the concurrent project involving an international acquisition, the ERP support team informed the business that all enhancements and non-critical fixes are on hold until the projects are complete. The business is not pleased that they have to wait for improvements. Implementing even the required enhancements, related to statutory changes or changes in the disclosure statement, in addition to critical fixes and support requests is threatening to the upgrade schedule.
Unforeseen problems encountered during the upgrade menace the schedule further. The business did not allot time to perform in depth analysis before creating the upgrade schedule or starting development on the project. Some vital delivered functionality has changed significantly. The changes looked superficial when initially reviewed. The configuration in production for this functionality cannot transfer unmodified to the new version. Changes to the configuration of the software are extensive and require careful analysis to ensure the modified configuration delivers the same results.
International Acquisition Two
In 2006, LC acquired a second international business. The business tasked the ERP support team to transition the new company to the LC financial system by the end of the second quarter, 2007. Executives in the business had a whole year to manage this organizational change, communicate priorities, establish expectations, and coordinate requirements for this project. They did nothing. Decisions that should have been firm a year ago are still up in the air at the end of the first quarter, 2007. Despite the team's constant warning that indecision will delay implementation, executives and middle management continue to flounder. The program manager, chief architect, and development lead are driving the transition from an IT perspective while trying to obtain definite requirements from the business.
The international company is resistant to adjust to the LC financial system because they will lose vital functionality. The international company is small and they operate in a niche business. Their current financial system is highly specialized to their needs. The LC financial system does not and will not have the functionality to which they are accustomed. Executives and middle management have not intervened to lead the transition, communicate goals, or broker negotiations. Furthermore, they have delegated primary responsibility for this transition to IT members of the ERP financial support team without fully supporting choices suggested by the team. Indecision on the part of the business is frustrating all parties involved.
Divergence from Best Practices
LC's ERP background and current initiatives illustrate the areas in which they stray from ERP implementation and upgrade best practices documented in the literature review. LC does not handle organizational change management well, especially during mergers and transitions. Executives and middle management do not foster support for the ERP team during regular maintenance or larger project endeavors. In fact, the ERP support team is composed of and is managed by IT staff. The outcome of the deviation is not always negative. The company does not consider business process re-engineering; it may cost them money, but they are perfectly satisfied with their operations and have been able to support their ERP system successfully without re-engineering their processes. Moreover, LC has customized the ERP source code extensively, which is one of most ardently discouraged behaviors in literature and industry, but in some cases, the manner in which the modifications are performed eases the upgrade process.
No Business Strategic Plan or Business Process Re-engineering
LC's implementation and upgrade projects are the results of the organization's technical needs. There is no business strategy or business efficiency plan associated with this work against which to measure system performance or return on investment. LC attempts to reduce expense by cutting funding to overhead programs, including the budget allotted to ERP system support. Gains that LC enjoys in operational efficiency are coincidental by products associated with technology advancement. For instance, cash flow improved by implementing PeopleSoft because interface processing occurs weekly rather than monthly. Although there was no effort to improve strategy or streamline processes, the domestic merger and two international acquisitions prompted ERP system changes for business related reasons. Sunday interface processing is an unplanned benefit of the international acquisition. Processing before the acquisition occurred early on Monday mornings, which is halfway through the business day in Europe. Consequently, interface processing happens on Sunday morning. LC's domestic business gained extra productive hours on Sunday afternoons and early Monday mornings.
LC has not participated in any voluntary financial business process re-engineering in twenty-two years. A merger forced extensive change in the business process during the domestic business amalgamation. Although onerous, modifications to the operational plan were not as remarkable as they could have been. Most of the changes materialized in the addition of new components and additional requirements in the process rather than reworking existing operational practices. Participants in this case study opine that extensive process re-engineering requires considerable time and money and results in more overhead cost to the business. The majority of LC's contracts have cost recovery terms. Reducing overhead expenditures is always a main concern. Furthermore, because LC is one company in a corporation, their business process is somewhat constrained by corporate regulations.
LC has diverged from best practices by not establishing a strategic plan related to their ERP system or considering changes to their business processes to align them more closely with the configuration options provided by the software package they use. Even though LC has not followed these best practices, the case study participants believe that LC is successful with respect to their strategic plan and business process. The chief architect on the ERP support team, when asked if it was wise for LC to select an ERP system based on the fact that it is more easily customized than some other vendor offerings, replied that "In the long run, it was; the business wants to do what it wants to do. They do not want to change the business processes for anything. It was the best decision for the way that the business wants to operate." The staff ERP business analyst argued that the technical decisions related to Y2K for the implementation and remaining supported by the vendor for the upgrades are strategic plans to keep the business running with its current processes intact. LC is and has been for many years completely satisfied with their mode of operation. It does not want to change its process and has remained unwaveringly committed to its decisions since the implementation.
LC's implementation is successful from their perspective, but the success comes at a cost. Members of the support team think that it would be beneficial for the business to track strategic benefits and cost savings related to the ERP system because it might mean more financial and functional support for the support team in the end, especially from the executive level. The most severe economic consequence of refusing to re-engineer business processes is creating and maintaining source code modifications. LC has aggressively customized their PeopleSoft system since the implementation. LC fosters an expensive and risky habit of customization in its organization that has intensified over time in terms of cost and the desire for more tailored features.
Customization
LC's ERP support team has customized the PeopleSoft system extensively. The team is busy adding new, enhancement modifications LC requests in order to tailor the system to match every need and whim of the business. The customization trend started during the implementation to retain the existing operational practices on the new software platform. Over the years, the ERP support team has created almost complete replacements for some PeopleSoft delivered modules, small stand-alone processes, and has modified the source code of delivered modules extensively. Over the past several years, LC has asked for increasing amounts of "nice to have" or "convenience" functionality in the form of customizations or new stand-alone features. The members of the ERP support team interviewed for this study cynically wonder if there is any part of the end-users' jobs that they don't want the ERP system customized to perform for them.
LC's enhancement requests cost the business money initially to implement and continue consuming budget over time when they require analysis and updating during a system upgrade. The staff ERP business analyst admits that the customizations can be, "a good idea when they give us a competitive advantage or they satisfy a new statutory requirement." The same participant thinks that LC has overly customized the system because, "the business does not allow for enough time in the upgrades to spend on customization analysis and re-application." During the very tight upgrade and transition schedules is when the extensive source code modifications are especially risky. The schedules do not allow time for careful examination of the delivered system changes, customization analysis, and further investigation to determine if a customization could be removed and replaced by software functionality in the new release. There tend to be more problems with software components that have both delivered and custom software intermingled than modules that LC has added to the system by cloning and replacing.
The case study participants do not recommend such extensive customization to other organizations. The program manager of the ERP support team has started to carefully analyze, and in some cases deny, enhancement requests when they appear frivolous or too precarious to attempt. The LC ERP support team has learned to manage their customization practices expertly, and advocates some of their successful practices to other companies faced with ERP source code customization. Avoid integrated customization, with a lot of custom source code and delivered logic intermingling. Whenever possible, clone the delivered logic and re-implement in a complete, stand-alone module. LC has found this practice valuable, especially in an organization that does not revisit its processes during upgrade because they expect the system to work identically between releases. The stand-alone modules require less analysis and change to re-apply during upgrade. If the business is pleased with the existing performance, this practice allows the technical team to ignore most newly delivered functionality that they would have to consider when upgrading an intermingled software component. Although LC has an almost insatiable need to enhance their ERP system, when the ERP support team needs more information on requirements or calls for assistance to test the new functionality, the business is often uncooperative.
Ineffective Organizational Change Management, Executive Support, and Business Involvement
Lack of business involvement in the ERP support team's daily activities is problematic. The software developer interviewed for the case study lists as an example an enhancement to internal billing software. "The enhancement was listed in the top ten of the most highly prioritized requests by the change control board. The customer took five months to get around to testing it and giving it approval for production after development and unit testing were completed in less than a week." The program manager and chief architect complain that there is never enough user acceptance testing support unless the team convinces a manager to allocate someone directly to the task, "It's impossible to accomplish anything because the IT team is driving the change. Upper management drives the IT department to meet their goals, but they won't drive their own employees to support the same priorities."
Executives communicate the priority and goals to the ERP support team, but not to the business employees on which the ERP support team relies to meet the established objective. They do not dedicate business employees to aid the ERP support team in gathering requirements or user acceptance testing. Employees are reluctant to donate time, are unaware of the priority, and are all still expected to support their normal workloads. Change in the organization resulting from a merger or acquisition is difficult because support from the executive level is superficial. The actions of the controller or other finance executives do not often coincide with priorities for the ERP system support team, goals for a project, or budgets and schedules that they communicate to the team during meetings. LC executives are also unwilling to make firm decisions required to meet project deadlines if they may be unpopular with a faction of employees. Even after work based on a decision is underway or completed, it is not unusual for LC to reverse its decision more than once, causing unnecessary re-work, frustration, and confusion for everyone involved. A big part of preparing for organizational change management is training users on the business process and the new technology employees use to complete their jobs.
LC does not allocate enough time or money for training. The business expects the IT staff to conduct quarterly training on the business process and the technology. They are also responsible for compiling the training materials. The staff ERP business analyst says that, "We could have more self service training for users who have immediate need. In addition, we should have more training for end users that is scenario based. They need to know how to recover if something goes wrong." The bottom line is affordability. LC does not want to spend the money required to enhance the training program.
Adherence to Best Practices
Effectively adhering to some best practices perpetuates the departures from suggested behavior related to other critical success factors. LC's ERP implementation is able to flourish with ineffective organizational change management, executive support, and business involvement because of their top-notch system support team. In fact, the support team is afraid that their incredible success over the past decade will lead to a failure in the future. In addition to exemplifying the critical success factor related to support team expertise, LC's ERP maintenance model is an example for other organizations to follow.
ERP Support Team Longevity and Expertise
LC staffed up for the PeopleSoft implementation in 1997, kept key members from the team together, and they have been responsible for the success of all of the projects since that time. The team members trained extensively in the technology and received a significant amount of knowledge from consultants during in the implementation project.
In addition, three of the full time employees hired to support development had an accounting background or had worked on the legacy accounting systems. During the course of the implementation, and over the course of the following decade, the developers substantially increased their pool of functional knowledge. As mentioned previously, it is unfortunately common for a financial analyst at LC to call the IT department expert to ask questions about their own business processes. (The business still has not documented them.) In order to remediate this problem, a weekly user group increases comprehension of the system and the business processes it embodies. The ERP support team leads these meetings; many users attend religiously. Recently, some of the expert employees have transitioned to leadership positions on the team while new developers learn to take on their responsibilities.
Since the hiring of new developers to the ERP support team started at the end of 2005, the veteran members of the team have instituted a weekly meeting solely for sharing functional and technical knowledge. This meeting, known as the developer group, has been very effective and has reduced some of the single-threaded characteristics of the knowledge distribution on the team. Although the team is extremely wise in the ways of the operational process at LC, there are not many people on the team. One developer had become the expert on contracts, another on billing, and so on. As the new developers accrue tenure and experience, this risk is becoming less significant in some areas. Unfortunately, for the new developers, it has become difficult to obtain formal training on the technology from Oracle Financials due to scheduling and budgetary constraints. The developer group also focuses on platform technology awareness. The case study participants suggest that the developer group and the user group weekly meetings are excellent and inexpensive practices for other organizations to employ as supplements to formal training.
The ERP support team, lead by the IT department, is so adept at managing all of the projects, everyday maintenance, user support, training, and largely being the competency center for financial operations at LC that it is becoming a risk to their future ERP success. They embody this critical success factor so well, that it allows the business to shirk its responsibility for managing the business process, organizational change, providing sufficient budget, and generally being involved in the support of the ERP system. Each year, the budget grows tighter and the team finds a way to do more with less. The program manager said during one interview, "Eventually LC is going to have to revisit the way the business is run. Constantly trying to save money by cutting the budget for ERP system support will backfire. We now operate in a way where we continue to survive in spite of lack of money. There are not enough resources right now to make improvements, just to make the critical priorities. Ultimately we are going to end up with [garbage] ." The staff ERP business analyst said, "Selfishly, we have let the business get away with letting us be a lean team. They set the bar higher and higher, and we are eventually not going to get away with it. It's risky, and the burden is on us." The narrative part of the case study illustrates the decline in all aspects of business support since LC's PeopleSoft implementation. For the implementation, LC had a large team composed of full time employees from the IT and functional departments plus consultants. The team received bonuses and a party after implementation. Through subsequent projects, the business participation declined steadily and the core support team diminished to an average of five full time developers with infrastructure support. Since the implementation, the support team has assumed more responsibility with each project, have received less money for training, and have started working on Sundays. There are no bonuses; the only parties are those funded from the project manager's own pocket to boost moral.
Excellent Maintenance Process
In addition to the full time developers and infrastructure support, the LC team consists of one full time functional employee and one employee in charge of the help desk. These team members are the interface to the business for daily operational questions and requests for support. The ERP support team has established a rigorous maintenance model to track all of their Customer Service Requests (CSRs). The ERP support team receives an average of 1,200 CSRs per year; 65% of those CSRs relate to user support. User support requests result from users who are confused about the business process or how the system works. Users may require help to recover from a data entry error, or they may think the system has processed data incorrectly and request an investigation. The full time functional employee and the help desk employee contact a developer if they cannot solve the problem independently. The remaining CSRs represent routine fixes or enhancement requests. A Change Control Board (CCB) comprised of key members from the business, the program manager, and the chief architect meet monthly to prioritize all routine fix and enhancement requests. The ERP support team completes work based on CCB priority.
The LC ERP support team recommends that organizations establish a strong maintenance model that includes a CCB. Participants indicated that they receive so many CSRs that they would not know what to do without an organization established to prioritize them. Moreover, the participants of the case study recommend establishing and publishing a process for customer support. Customers should know immediately who to contact if there is a problem, and that their problem will be solved in order of priority. This level of support is one way in which the ERP support team has earned the trust of the business. One problem the support team is working to overcome relates to customers using the help desk. Some long time system users know the lead developer for the area of the system they most often use. Over the past decade, they have established a close working relationship. These users often call or e-mail the developers directly with questions rather than contacting the help desk. The veteran developers have a difficult time enforcing the help desk policy with these customers because of their relationship.
Another successful aspect of the maintenance model used at LC is configuration management. Configuration management with ERP systems is often tricky and frequently requires specialized software that coincides with the ERP architecture. When dealing with financial data, it's very important to be able to reverse a change moved to production immediately if it causes a problem. Good configuration management systems also provide a facility for documenting requirements, test results, and e-mail communication related to changes, which eases the auditing process. LC recommends storing all configuration management documentation in the system, including infrastructure and database administration changes that have nothing to do with changing source code. Documentation is invaluable when staff changes, a similar problem occurs in the future, and during upgrades.
Conclusions
LC has considerable experience with all aspects of ERP implementation, upgrade, transition, and support. The ERP support team exemplifies some critical success factors related to ERP activities, but not all of them. The ERP support team at LC is partially comprised of experts who have been involved with the system for a decade. They also have an excellent maintenance process. Unfortunately, LC does not have a strategic business plan related to their ERP endeavors and does not consider business process engineering vital to their ERP success. LC has also diverged from the best practices outlined in the literature review by extensively customizing their ERP system source code and by having little business support or involvement in ERP projects or activities. Surprisingly, LC does not consider all of the consequences they experience from their critical success factor departures in a negative light. LC also does not consider the manner in which they embody published ERP best practices to be a complete success.
Although LC did not develop a strategic plan to streamline business processes and reap a return on investment after implementation or upgrade through gaining efficiency, they consider their ERP project a success. Their strategic plan includes maintaining a process with which they are familiar and satisfied. Over the past decade, LC improved their system through customization to align closely with their growing business at substantial cost. The ERP support team has developed a smart method of customization through stand-alone functionality that defrays upgrade cost and extensive analysis wherever possible. Despite the fact that LC has not followed the critical success factors discussed in the literature review in these areas, the business considers them successful.
Conversely, LC portrays a critical success factor so well that it intensifies a failure in another area. LC's ERP success through many projects is a result of the longevity, expertise, and dedication of its support team. The ERP team is composed of and is managed by IT personnel with as much or more functional knowledge than many of the customers the system supports. The business has taken advantage of this proficiency by becoming uninvolved. The IT team is the keeper of the business process, because it is documented largely by source code. LC manages organizational change through training, which the ERP support team coordinates and conducts quarterly. Since the implementation, the ERP support team has fostered a reputation of endless competency; each year they seem to accomplish more work with less money. Consequently, each year the business provides them with less money. Although the ERP support team is proud of their hard won success, they agree that it has become a risk. The business must become more involved. The biggest challenge listed by all case study participants is budget related, and the ERP support team's success is partially to blame.
Behavior precedents established during the initial ERP implementation a decade ago at LC have remained largely unchanged. In some cases, practices that started during the implementation have become detrimentally extreme. During the implementation project, LC dedicated a small number of business representatives to the project that decided to maintain existing operational practices. Over the years, LC has become more adamant about preserving the way it does business; it refuses even to consider the possibility of change during ERP projects. The technical team that participated in the very successful ERP system implementation perpetuated its triumph throughout each subsequent project. The business stakeholders at LC are so confident in the support team's endless competence that they no longer seriously reflect on the prospect or consequence of a system failure. The intense extremes in conduct that have developed since the project started have come to highlight the areas of dysfunction in the company's ERP support infrastructure.
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